My areas of research interest are political philosophy, philosophy of law, and metaethics.

Solidaristic Mechanism Design

The notion of a solidaristic ethos is central to the work of Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and Rawls. I seek to clarify the content and the historical as well as contemporary import of this ideal and to contribute to the design and implementation of institutions that would enable publics to realize it.  

The Multiple Standpoint Conception of Agency
and Practical Reasoning

I argue that there are two basic kinds of reasons for action. The first is a classical reason of the following form: the action is of value. The second is a subagential reason of a different form: the action is a part in a collective action that is of value or a step in a course of action that is of value. I further argue that the idea of subagential reasons is key to a value-first explanation of deontic requirements, such as authoritative directives, rules, and duties. Requirements of this kind pose a challenge for any such value-first explanation.For such requirements are reasons for action that are characteristically value-insensitive or pre-emptive. For example, it is commonly thought that one might have reason to keep a promise or conform to a duty of justice even when doing so is not of value. I argue that reasons of this pre-emptive kind are subagential reason—reasons to perform one’s part or step in a larger valuable action—and that the reason-giving force of such reasons is grounded in the value of the larger action rather than the value of performing any particular part or step in that larger action. My ultimate goal is to provide an account of normative powers, claim-rights, duties, immunities, liabilities and legal as well as other institutional reasons in terms of the idea of subagential reasons.

Metaethics and Jurisprudence

I am developing a variant of neopragmatic theory of thought-content and meaning. The key thesis is that most any shared folk concept is more accurately construed as a plastic template that speakers can tailor to satisfy the varying discursive interests salient in particular contexts, rather than an item with a unitary, determinate content that is invariant across contexts and shared by the relevant folk.

On this view, we should not hastily presume that folk moral and legal concepts are unitary and determinate, irrespective of context. Rather, they are determinate only in particular discursive contexts, and they are unitary only insofar as speakers share a set of recurrently predominating discursive interests that dictate a consistent content across numerous contexts.

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For my work in progress along these lines, feel free to contact me at stefan.sciaraffa at gmail.com.

In a book project tentatively titled Law and the Morality of Political Community, I apply this variant of neopragmatism to address longstanding issues in metaethics and general jurisprudence.

My approach to metaethics and jurisprudence and my interests in subagential reasons and institutional design are connected. For a key implication of the former is that egalitarian communities of meaning and shared reasons and politico-moral commitments are contingent possibilities whose realization depends on the existence of enabling social, legal, and political institutions.